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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Clifford Case (R., N.J.) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Staffers Regarding the Recent Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Strategic Forces and the "B Team" Report

1. I accompanied Richard Lehman, D/DCI/NI, Howard Stoertz, NIO/Strategic Programs, and George Cary to a meeting with Senator Clifford Case (R., N.J.) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staffers Bill Miller, Hal Ford, Anne Karalekas, and Ted Ralston, to discuss the recent NIE 11-3/8 on Soviet strategic forces and the "B Team" report on the same subject. Lehman and Stoertz discussed at length the history and reasons for the establishment of the "B Team," which began with the concern of some PFIAB members that the NIE's on the subject did not accurately reflect Soviet intentions. There have been many press articles on the estimate and the "B Team" report, and Lehman and Stoertz refuted some of the points in the press accounts.

2. Miller had two primary criticisms of official actions in this regard. First, he felt the make-up of the "B Team" was so one-sided that the team could not reach an independent objective position, which is what PFIAB ostensibly sought. Lehman made it clear that the whole "B Team" exercise, including selection of members, was largely a PFIAB exercise and that the Intelligence Community had very limited options. Miller's second criticism was that the estimates do not factor in U.S. forces and U.S. defense planning. Miller viewed this as a function which the Intelligence Community could accomplish, so that the estimate would not only be an assessment of Soviet forces, but a net assessment of the strategic "balance of power." Lehman's view was that a net assessment would be a useful tool to the Administration, but suggested it could best be prepared by the National Security Council with an input on Soviet forces from the Intelligence Community, and a report on U.S. forces from the Department of Defense. Miller gradually seemed to accept Lehman's view on this point. Miller also seemed upset that the group of analysts preparing

the official estimate had allowed themselves to be classified as "soft" whereas, in reality, this group represented a wide spectrum of views. Lehman pleaded that we had nothing to do with this characterization; this was the interpretation of the officials who discussed the controversy with the press and the press' own embellishment.

3. Miller asked if the DCI had launched an investigation into the leaks about the NIE and the "B Team" report. Lehman replied the DCI had not because knowledge of the reports were too wide spread in the Intelligence Community and therefore, the likelihood of a successful investigation was very limited.

4. Miller stated he felt great damage had been done to the estimative process and serious questions raised in the public and official mind about the integrity of the process. He suggested it might be advisable to establish a totally impartial board consisting of panelists with widely varying views to objectively and independently re-examine the whole question. Lehman responded that there could not be any initiative now as Mr. Sorensen had not even been briefed on the problem, but that Lehman felt that an examination of the question by an oversight committee would be helpful in clearing questions raised by the leaks. Lehman was confident that such an investigation would exonerate the estimative process which he characterized as being "grossly maligned." Miller seemed to support such an investigation by the Select Committee, but what form it might take is unclear. Mention of the competitive analysis experiment will be made in the Committee's unclassified report on the quality of intelligence, a draft of which is due in early 1977.

5. Mr. Cary had, prior to the meeting, obtained the DCI's approval for showing both the estimate and the "B Team" report to the Committee. Both Senator Case and the staff members glanced through the two reports during the briefing and we agreed to make them both available for further study at Headquarters. This arrangement was acceptable to Miller who stated several times that the Agency had been totally cooperative in this matter.

Assistant Legislative Counsel